





I.  No presumption that 
innovation is welfare enhancing
• No first theorem of welfare economics when technology is 
endogenous
• Arrow and Debreu assumed fixed technology
• Much of support for market economy based on innovation
• Schumpeter argued for advantages of monopoly
• Subsequent research showed that all of presumptions underlying 
Schumpeter’s analysis were wrong (monopolies would be 
temporary, contest to be monopolist ensured fast pace of 
innovation, contestability ensured that monopolist couldn’t 
exploit market power)
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Presumption that market economies on 
their own are not efficient in innovation
• Subsequent work explained why presumption against efficiency
• Innovation as a public good
• IPR restricted dissemination, use, even pace of innovation (most important 
ingredient into research is knowledge)
• Innovation is inherently risky, marked by imperfect information and 
incomplete insurance markets
• Greenwald-Stiglitz 1986 showed that whenever markets were incomplete and 
information was imperfect, markets are not constrained Pareto efficient
• Knowledge can be viewed as a form of information
• Inefficiency in the production of knowledge
• Also, fixed costs associated with innovation gives rise to imperfect 
competition (sometimes can be modeled as monopolistic competition, 
sometimes as oligopolistic competition)  
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II.  This paper explores one dimension of these 
inefficiencies:  Adverse effects on wages, 
unemployment, and societal welfare
• Series of simple models (variants of models already in the literature)
• Central argument:  tendency for excessive “labor saving 
innovation”
• Combining standard model of efficiency wages (explaining 
unemployment) with standard theories of biased technological 
change
• Cost minimizing point where elasticity of curve = relative shares 
(sL/sK)
• Analysis based on expectations (could be myopic or “rational”)
• Can exist multiple equilibria
(Based on Stiglitz, “Unemployment and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper 20670, November 2014 and  
“Samuelson and the Factor Bias of Technological Change,” Samuelsonian Economics and the Twenty-First 
Century, M. Szenberg et al, eds., Oxford University Press: New York, 2006, pp. 235-251 and Stiglitz and 
Greenwald, Creating a Learning Society: A New Approach to Growth, Development, and Social Progress, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Reader’s Edition published 2015, and extensive earlier literature) 
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5Figure 1
Q = F(μK, λL)
where {μ, λ} are capital and labor augmenting 
innovation, respectively
Simple model:  fixed coefficients technology
(results easily generalized)
Q/K = b, Q/L = a
Innovation frontier:  given at, bt
(1)  bt+1 = z (at+1)
Cost minimization entails
Min w/a + r/b
Implying 
Z ≡ dln z/dln a = -sL/sK
With concave innovation frontier, cost minimization implies that larger 
share of labor, more labor saving innovation; the larger the share of 
unskilled labor relative to skilled labor (at “perceived prices”) the more 
skilled biased technological change 6
Broad interpretation
• Costs as perceived by “decision maker”
• Agency issues
• Managerial costs of labor
• Search costs for labor
• Interpretation of “scarcity of labor” (Habakkuk, 1962, and Salter, 1962)
• Differences between these costs and social (shadow) prices will 
play a role in the following discussion
• When there is unemployment, shadow price of labor differs from 
market price
• Importance of macroeconomic externalities 7
Qualifications/assumptions
With convex innovation frontier, critical w/r at which there is a shift from capital 
augmenting innovation to labor augmenting innovation
Result holds regardless of structure of industrial organization (e.g. competitive, 
monopolistic equilibrium, oligopolistic equilibrium)
Firm has to think of dynamic path of factor prices:  in example, just focuses on minimizing 
costs next period
• Relevant case if knowledge produced at t for t + 1 becomes publicly available at t + 2.  
• Then firm only focuses on “private” benefits of innovation, which occur at time t.
• With symmetric equilibrium, all firms do same innovation, so spillovers irrelevant
In more general model, direction of innovation could differ across sectors
• Localized technological change (Atkinson-Stiglitz, 1969) emphasizes innovation as 
specific to particular activities, changing shape of production function
• History matters—episode of low interest rates can have long lasting effects
• Most of following discussion focuses on symmetric equilibrium 
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III. Consequences of labor saving 
innovation
• If the economy is able to achieve full employment, equilibrium wage is 
lowered—workers worse off
• With inequality averse social welfare function, social welfare lowered unless 
there is redistribution
• Redistribution may be costly—in which case it may be impossible to achieve welfare 
improvement
• Welfare enhancing redistributions are economically feasible—the question is, will 
they occur
• Increased wealth of “capitalists” increases their ability 
• to resist redistributions
• to reduce progressivity of taxation or make it regressive (as has happened in US)
• Inducing firms to engage in more rent-seeking behavior, increasing inequality still further
(Based in part on Kornek and Stiglitz, 2017, “Artificial Intelligence and Its Implications for Income Distribution and 
Unemployment,” forthcoming NBER volume)
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With redistributions, inclusive growth is 
possible but without redistributions, labor 






















Consider arrival of a new technology that replaces workers.
Would their standard of living necessarily collapse?
If (i) the world is 1st-best but (ii) redistribution is limited, the 
constrained utility possibilities frontier (UPF) may not lie 
outside the original schedule:
 Limiting technological change may be desirable for workers 
and for social welfare
IV.  Labor saving innovations, efficiency 
wages, and unemployment
To analyze unemployment, need a “theory” of unemployment
Efficiency wages provides a simple well-grounded theory
With efficiency wages, labor saving innovations lead to higher unemployment and lower wages
Q = F(μK, λL)
Where {μ, λ} are capital and labor augmenting innovation, respectively
Real wage w = λ [f – κf’], where κ is effectively capital labor ratio (μK/ λL).  
• Labor saving innovation shifts demand for labor down at each value of the real wage (for fixed 
{K,μ})
(1) E = ψ (w; λ)
where E is employment level
• Efficiency wage: the real wage if a function of the unemployment rate, which we write as  w = ξ 
^(U), or since at any moment, the Unemployment rate is just a function of the level of 
employment, 
• (2) w = ξ(E), 
With ξ’ > 0. 
Equilibrium is solution to (1) and (2).  Labor saving innovation leads to lower w and employment 
(higher unemployment)
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V.  Consequences of monetary policy in demand 
constrained macroeconomic equilibrium 
Illustration of general point
• Lower interest rate designed to stimulate investment
• But also lowers relative cost of capital (share of capital)
• Observed increase in return to capital related to monopoly/oligopoly rents
• Induces labor augmenting innovation—which reduces demand for labor
• Ambiguous effects in the short to medium run (benefit of more investment has to be 
set against cost of lower employment)
• Making it possibly more difficult to restore economy to full employment
(Labor augmenting innovation is labor saving if elasticity of substitution is less than unity)
• Intertemporal trade off in unemployment in demand constrained equilibrium
• Investment, aggregate demand, and employment increases in short run
• But labor required to meet future demand reduced
• Not a problem if monetary and fiscal policy can restore economy to full employment
• But is a problem if there are constraints, e.g. if future level of output is fixed
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VI.  Sectoral reallocations can lead to innovation 
being Pareto inferior—and high unemployment
Discussion so far has ignored adjustment costs
With adjustments costs, even greater likelihood of welfare 
decreasing innovation, in absence of government interventions
There are government interventions that can ensure innovation is 
welfare increasing
• Combining Keynesian stimulation with industrial/sectoral policies
• Another application of basic insight:  what is individually rationale 
may not be collectively rational when there are “market failures”
• Innovation is rife with market failures
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Simple model demonstrating this
Model provides explanation of what happened in Great Depression
• Technological change can affect different sectors differently, necessitating a reallocation of labor 
in first best equilibrium
• But reallocating labor is costly
• And there may be rigidities:  in decentralized economy, individuals in sector requiring 
“outmigration” may not have resources to move to new location and to get necessary education
• Their own human and financial capital (value of housing) may be impaired
• They cannot buy insurance against these contingencies; and most individuals do not buy the 
incomplete insurance that they could buy through structured finance
• Well understood capital market imperfections 
(Based on D. Delli Gatti, M. Gallegati, B. Greenwald,  A. Russo and J. E. Stiglitz, “Mobility Constraints, 
Productivity Trends, and Extended Crises,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,  2012, 83(3): 
375– 393 and "Sectoral Imbalances and Long Run Crises," in The Global Macro Economy and Finance,  F. 
Allen, M. Aoki, J.-P. Fitoussi, N. Kiyotaki, R. Gordon, and J.E. Stiglitz, eds., IEA Conference Volume No. 
150-III, Houndmills, UK and New York: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 61-97.)
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Great Depression as an example
• Innovation in agriculture combined with price and income inelastic 
demand led to increase in supply, decrease in agricultural prices 
and income
• When pace of innovation was moderate and other circumstances 
favorable, individuals could migrate out of agriculture sector to 
urban sector—earlier in 20’s, from 30% of population to 25% (a 
one-sixth decline) 
• In late twenties, marked fall in prices (in some cases by 75%) and 
income (by more than 50%), with effects amplified by resulting 
financial sector distress:  migration stopped—labor was trapped
• Decreased demand for urban goods
• With efficiency wages employment in urban sector decreased
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Basic Model
Two sectors (industry, agriculture)
(1)  βα =  βDAA (p, pα) + E DMA (p , w* )
(2)  H(E) = βDAM (p, pα) + E DMM (p , w* ) + I
β is the labor force in agriculture, (1 - β) is the labor force in industry, 
α is productivity in agriculture,
Dij is demand from those in sector i for goods from sector j
w* is the (fixed) efficiency wage in the urban sector,
I is the level of investment (assumed to be industrial goods), 
p is the price of agricultural goods in terms of manufactured goods, 
which is chosen as the numeraire, and 
E is the level of employment  (E ≤ 1 - β);
and where we have normalized the labor force at unity.
H(E) is the total production of industrial goods




• Demand equals supply of agricultural goods
Higher employment in manufacturing leads to higher demand for 
food, and hence higher p.
• Demand equals supply of manufactured goods
Higher price of agriculture goods leads to higher income in rural 
sector, and thus more manufacturing employment
Can be multiple equilibrium
Most of analysis focuses on impact on (stable) equilibrium from 




Normally (under stability condition, other plausible 
conditions) with immobile labor
an increase in agricultural productivity unambiguously 
yields a reduction in the relative price of agriculture 
and in employment in manufacturing. 
The result of mobility-constrained agricultural sector 
productivity growth is an extended economy-wide slump
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21Figure 5: The effects of an increase in agricultural productivity
Government Expenditures
• Under the stability condition, an increase in government 
expenditure increases urban employment and raises agricultural 
prices and incomes
• In figure 6, productivity shock shifts employment from E* to E’
• Keynesian stimulus brings economy back to E*
Even though problem is structural, Keynesian policies work
Even more effective if spending is directed at underlying structural problem
• Migration subsidy can help economy adjust, overcoming market 
imperfection 22
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Figure 6: Impact of Keynesian stimulus: 
an increase of G shifts the MM curve from M’M’ to M’’M’’ 
and increases both employment and rural prices
24Figure 7: Effects of Migration Subsidy
Emerging from the Great Depression
• New Deal was not big enough to offset negative effects of declining farm 
income
• And New Deal was not sustained
• Cutbacks in 1937 in response to worries about fiscal deficit led once again to a downturn
• And much of Federal spending offset by cutbacks at state and local level
• WWII was a massive Keynesian stimulus
• Moved people from rural to urban sector
• Provided them with training
• Especially in conjunction with GI bill
• It was thus an “industrial policy” as well as a Keynesian stimulus policy
• Forced savings during War provided stimulus to buy goods after War
• In contrast to the legacy of debt now
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Wages
In model, under normal conditions, lowering urban wages 
lowers agricultural prices and urban employment
• High (rigid) wages are not the problem
• Lowering wages would lower aggregate demand—worsen the 
problem
• In this crisis, the US—country with most flexible labor 
market—has had poor job performance, worse than many 
others
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27Figure 8: The effects of downward wage adjustments
VII.  Private profit maximization leads 
to excessive labor saving innovation
Assuming that costless redistributions are possible, social welfare is 
maximized by maximizing national output with respect to λ, taking into 
account the effect of λ on the unemployment rate: 
max F(μK, λ(1 – U)L)
where U is the unemployment rate, i.e.,
d(lnQ)/d(lnλ) = {F1 λ Z'K +F2[(1 - U) λL] - wλL dU/d(lnλ)}/Q
= [rμK d(lnμ)/d(lnλ) + (1 – U)Lλ w - wλL dU/d(lnλ)]/Q 
=    sk d(lnμ)/d(lnλ) + (1 – sk){1 + d[ln (1 -U)]/d(lnλ)}
At the private sector optimization, this is < or > 0 as dU/dln λ > or < 0: 
There is excessive labor-augmenting innovation if the effect of innovation 
is to increase the unemployment rate, i.e. if σ < 1. 
If elasticity of substitution is less than unity, labor augmenting t.c. is labor 
saving.
Converse results hold if the elasticity of substitution is greater than one
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VIII.  Complex dynamics of adjustment and 
multiple momentary equilibria
• High wages lead to labor augmenting innovation, reducing demand for labor, 
lowering wages
• Low wages lead to capital augmenting innovation, resulting in large increases 
in demand for labor from any given level of investment
• In life cycle model, if workers think (rationally) that the rate of return will be 
high, they will save (and invest) little, in which case wages will be low and the 
return to capital will be high
• But if they believe that the rate of return will be low, they will save (and invest) a 
lot, in which cases wages will be high and return to capital will be low
• Effects moderated by factor biased innovation
• Multiplicity of momentary equilibrium easy to generate, but does not hold for all 
preferences, production functions
• When there is multiplicity of momentary equilibrium, there are an infinite number 
of paths consistent with rational expectations
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Dynamics:  simple case with fixed 
coefficients
and fixed savings rate (results can be generalized)
I = sQ = dK/dt
s is the savings rate, I is investment, and K is the capital stock
dln μ/dt ≡ m = z(Λ)
m is rate of capital augmenting progress
Λ is rate of labor augmenting progress
Λ≡ dln λ/dt.
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Choice of direction function of relative shares (as before)—taking 
limit to continuous time
Z (Λ )≡ - d(lnz)/d(ln Λ) =  sL/ (1- sL) ≡Φ (κ)
Where (as before) sL is share of labor, which is just a function of the 
effective capital labor ratio, κ:
κ =μ K  /λL
Can solve for Λ as a function of κ:
Λ = z-1 (Φ (κ)) ≡ θ(κ).
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Evolution of economy described by: 
dln μ/dt= m = z(Λ) = z(θ(κ)).
dln κ /dt = dln K/dt + m – Λ – n
= S μ (f(κ )/ κ) + z (θ(κ)) - θ(κ)– n 
Where n is the rate of growth of population 
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Steady State
• z (θ(κ*)) = 0




Concluding Remarks:  Theory of growth
• Solow reconciled disparity between warranted and natural rate of growth 
by assuming neoclassical production function
• Theory of biased induced innovation shows alternative way of 
reconciliation
• With technology adjusting, even when at any moment there are fixed 
coefficients
• In Solow, distribution of income is determined by factor supplies, with 
given technology.  Distribution of income plays no role in evolution of 
economy
• In fixed coefficients induced innovation model, efficiency wage theory 
determines distribution which affects evolution of economy
• Markedly different dynamics
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Concluding remarks:  innovation and 
unemployment
• Presumption that economy is not efficient in pattern of 
innovation
• Excessive investment in labor saving innovations
• Resulting in too high a level of unemployment, too low wages
• Insufficient investment in innovations saving the planet
• Example of macroeconomic externality
• Resulting in lower wages and higher unemployment
• Pace of innovation may not be sensitive to ability of economy to 
absorb “shocks”
• Important non-linearities:  if pace is too fast, innovation can lead to 
lower output, not just lower wages
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Concluding remarks:  policy
• Wages affect evolution of productivity
• Wage compression policies of Scandinavia lead to increased productivity of unskilled workers (unskilled 
bias t.c.)
• Minimum wages may have similar effects
• Putting additional burden of fiscal and monetary policy to maintain full employment
• Increasing carbon price may shift innovation towards those which save the planet
• May be desirable to have a tax on robots (more generally, on labor saving innovations) to help 
internalize externality
• May be desirable to stabilize pace of innovation (variety of tools by which this may be done)
• Monetary policy needs to be sensitive to effects on induced innovation
• May be trade-off between unemployment today and unemployment later
• Active policies—Keynesian industrial policies—can lower unemployment, increase output, facilitate 
transitions
• In absence of active government policies, innovation from a decentralized market economy may be 
welfare reducing
• Especially if redistributions are constrained/costly
37
Concluding Remarks
• The more willing society is to support the necessary 
transition and to provide support to those who are “left 
behind,” the faster the pace of innovation that society can 
accommodate, and still ensure that the outcomes are Pareto 
and welfare improvements.  
• A society that is not willing to engage in such actions should 
expect resistance to innovation, with uncertain political and 
economic consequences. (Korinek and Stiglitz, 2017)
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